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Recent Decisions
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw
GOVERNMENTAL COMPETITION WITH PRIVATE ENTERPRISE
Proceeding for the validation of county revenue anticipation
certificates for the acquisition and construction of truck and rail-
road freight terminal facilities. The Georgia constitution of 1945
provides that such certificates can be issued only for the purposes
expressly authorized by the "Revenue Certificate Laws of 1937,"
as amended in 1939. GA. CODE ANNr., § 2-6005. The pertinent sec-
tion of this act provides for the issuance of such certificates for
the purpose of acquiring and constructing "highways, parkways,
airports, docks, piers, wharves, terminals and other facilities."
GA. CODE ANN., § 87-802 (a) (2). The projected undertaking was
to be a warehouse, part of the space of which was to be devoted to
temporary storage of goods between their arrival by common car-
rier and their delivery. The remainder of the space, however, was
to be leased to tenants on a permanent basis. The question was
whether or not this warehouse was a "terminal." Held, judgment
in favor of validation of the certificates was reversed. Beazley v.
DeKalb County, 210 Ga. 41, 77 S.E. 2d 740 (1953).
The court invoked formal judicial methods of interpretation in
formulating its definition of "terminal" as a place provided by or
for common carriers for the purpose of receiving and discharging
passengers and freight, including buildings and structures inci-
dental to those purposes. The court did some sleuthing on its own
to discover that the total warehouse space occupied by the common
carriers serving the entire Atlanta area was 550,000 square feet,
while the proposed warehouse, also in metropolitan Atlanta, was to
cover 2,000,000 square feet. It concluded from these facts that the
warehouse was not to be primarily a terminal, but a general ware-
house.
Although the instant case was decided on the narrow issue of
the validity of the revenue anticipation certificates, the closing
paragraphs of the opinion reveal that the court did not feel this to
be an appropriate governmental economic venture, regardless of
the method of financing. It is the American heritage that govern-
ment affords the framework in which the individual pursues his
private interests, that the government does not compete economical-
ly with the individual. From the earliest days of our nation it has
been held that there are limits to governmental intrusion into the
capitalistic economy. This was regarded as a general rule of law,
inherent in the Constitution. Early cases did not cite a specific
constitutional provision upon which to bottom the restrictions, but
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overturned excessive governmental participation on the basis of
implicit limitations. Olcott v. Supervisors, 16 Wall. 678 (U. S.
1872); Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655 (U. S. 1874). A catch-all
phrase was first attached to this limitation about the middle of the
19th century. Sharpless v. The Mayor, 21 Pa. 147 (1853). "Public
purpose" still stands today as the test of the legality of the govern-
ment in business. The public purpose test soon found a concrete
guardian. The Supreme Court of the United States, followed by
the state courts, awoke to the proposition that the use of public
funds for other than a public purpose violated the due process
clauses of the federal and state constitutions. Fallbrook Irrigation
Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U. S. 112 (1896). Later cases firmly estab-
lished this approach. Jones v. City of Portland, 245 U. S. 217
(1917); Green v. Frazier 253 U. S. 233 (1920). The due process
clause thus became the palladium of the free enterprise system.
See Note, 41 HtARv. L. REV. 775 (1928); Kneier, Municipal Func-
tions and the Law of Public Purpose, 76 U. OF PA. L. REV. 824
(1928); McAllister, Public Purpose in Taxation, 5 SEL. ESSAYS OF
CONST. LAW, pp 1-32 (1938), 18 CALIF. L. REV., pp. 137-148 and
241-254 (1930).
But the United States Supreme Court rendered a striking
decision in Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502 (1934). This case
practically removed the restrictions that had been read into the due
process clause of the Federal Constitution. Asserting that "A state
is free to adopt whatever economic policy may reasonably be deemed
to promote public welfare," the Court seemed willing to accept
any economic system that the states may see fit to adopt, even
state socialism. The upshot of this decision is that the due process
clauses of the Federal Constitution no longer guarantee a com-
petitive, or even a capitalistic, economy.
Even before Nebbia v. New York, supra, the Supreme Court
had manifested a predilection toward the state courts' determina-
tion of public purpose. This was first clearly established in Green
v. Frazier, supra, which affirmed the North Dakota Industrial
Program, an extensive arrangement of public ownership. The Su-
preme Court of Nebraska was affirmed in permitting a municipality
to operate a gasoline station, on the grounds that petroleum prod-
ucts are necessities. Standard Oil Co. v. City of Lincoln, 114 Neb.
243, 207 N.W. 172, 208 N.W. 962 (1926), affirmed, 275 U.S. 504
(1927).
Despite developments in the Supreme Court of the United
States, many state courts still apply the public purpose test to
governmental economic ventures. Thus the Supreme Court of
Ohio finds in the state constitution all the restrictions that were
once deemed a part of the Federal Constitution. The city of Cleve-
land was enjoined from engaging in the garage business, on the
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grounds that it was not a public purpose. City of Cleveland v.
Ruple, 130 Ohio St. 465, 200 N.E. 507 (1936). A later case has
evinced a more liberal interpretation of public purpose, permitting
the city of Columbus to operate an off-street parking lot, on the
grounds that private enterprise had failed to meet the public need.
State ex rel. Gordon v. Rhodes, 156 Ohio St. 81, 100 N.E. 2d 225
(1951). But the old test still stands in Ohio, and in many other
states.
There is healthy disagreement among the state courts over
where to draw the line of demarcation between public and private
purpose. See Notes, 14 A.L.R. 1151 (1921), and 115 A.L.R. 1456
(1938). The tendency is to expand the public purpose category.
Early cases stressed that a natural monopoly should exist before
the government can engage in a particular enterprise. VIlunn v.
Illinois, 94 U. S. 113 (1876). Later cases felt that the service
rendered must be a necessity to the community. Brass v. North
Dakota, 153 U. S. 391 (1894); Standard Oil Co. v. City of Lincoln,
supra. Still another standard, the breakdown or failure of free
competition, has received judicial consideration. Jones v. City of
Portland, supra; State ex rel. Gordon v. Rhodes, supra. See Mc-
Allister, supra.
The closing paragraphs of the opinion in the instant case
clearly asserted a conservative definition of public purpose by the
Georgia court. It is the author's opinion that this particular munici-
pal undertaking would not have been permitted, even if financed
other than by revenue anticipation certificates, for it would have
amounted to a step toward state socialism, clearly repugnant to the
conservative position of the Supreme Court of Georgia.
David G. Sherman
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - MUNICIPAL REGULATION -
SOLICITING CONTRIBUTIONS FOR CHARITABLE PURPOSES
Action by the American Cancer Society to enjoin the enforce-
ment of an ordinance regulating the solicitation of contributions
for charitable purposes by prohibiting such solicitations without a
license. The ordinance provided for a solicitation advisory board
which should recommend a license only where it deemed the ap-
plicant a worthy agency in a charitable cause not already adequate-
ly covered. The board refused plaintiff's application for a license on
the ground that it had failed to join the "community fund." The
court of appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court which held
that the board's action and ordinance were in violation of the pro-
visions of the Constitution of Ohio and the Constitution of the
United States. On appeal, held such an ordinance is void, since it
authorizes a restraint upon the common right of charitable solici-
tation, as guaranteed by both the Ohio and United States Constitu-
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tions. A licensing body must have fixed standards for determining
whether a license is to be issued. American Cancer Society v. Day-
ton, 160 Ohio St. 114, 114 N.E. 2d 219 (1953).
The Supreme Court of Ohio in the principal case predicated
its decision upon two grounds. The first reason for the decision was
that the action taken by the board, which in effect denied the
charitable organization the right to solicit unless it became a mem-
ber of the community chest, violated substantive due process.
Practically all constitutional guaranties are subject to police power
and there is no doubt that charitable solicitation may be regulated.
Previous cases construing the extent of this power over the person
ha:-e held that cities may reasonably regulate the hours and places
of such solicitations, Ex parte Dart, 172 Cal. 47, 155 Pac. 63 (1916);
may restrain beggars, vagrants, and habitual drunkards, Lawton v.
Steel, 152 U. S. 133, 136 (1884); and may prohibit house to house
canvassing, Prior v. White, 132 Fla. 1, 180 So. 347 (1938). Indeed,
it has been stated that a statute will be sustained as a proper ex-
ercise of the state's police power though objects affected by it may
be wholly innocent. Queenside Hills Realty Co. v. Saxl, 328 U. S.
80 (1945). But this police power is definitely circumscribed when
civil liberties are involved, Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U. S. 496 (1939);
legislative choice of policy in matters of civil organization is no
longer essentially unrestricted. And the Ohio court is clear that,
under the Federal and State Constitutions, the solicitation of funds
and the dissemination of knowledge for and with reference to a
worthy charitable organization are within the fundamental princi-
ples of liberty of action and freedom of speech and as such are
embodied in the concept "due process of law".
Given these limitations on governmental power, the ordinance
was too vague and indefinite to have a substantial relation to any
permitted objective; it could be used not only to prohibit activities
which the state may constitutionally proscribe but also those activi-
ties which government now has no right to prohibit. This is illus-
trated by the fact that a prior permit granted to the applicant
was conditioned upon its becoming a member of the Community
Chest. And although a licensing ordinance contains a proviso that
it shall not apply to the annual campaign of the Community Chest
it is still invalid because it grants immunities which are not equally
applicable to all citizens and corporations. Seattle v. Rogers, 5
Wash. 2d 599, 106 P. 2d 598 (1940).
The second assigned reason for holding the ordinance invalid
was the absence of sufficiently definite standards for the guidance
of the board in the performance of its constitutional functions. This
holding was based upon the reasoning of Cantwell v. Connecticut,
309 U. S. 626 (1940), which held that the nonexistence of definite
standards allowed a discretion fatal to such legislation since it
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would authorize a prior restraint upon the exercise of the guaran-
teed freedoms. The ordinance must state a standard for the guid-
ance of the official who passes upon the application for the permit.
Hoyt Bros v. Grand Rapids, 260 Mich. 447, 245 N.W. 509 (1942).
The official board can exercise no unreasonable discretion but
should be able to issue the certificate as a matter of course after
a proper determination of the facts.
There has been a conflict among state court decisions as to the
validity of the administrative provisions of ordinances regulating
charitable solicitations. A Pennsylvania decision has sustained an
ordinance exempting all charitable institutions from obtaining a
license if they filed reports with the departments of state govern-
ment, even though the licensing board ultimately determined the
status of the alleged charity if it failed to file a report. Common-
wealth v. McDermott 266 Pa. 299, 145 Atl. 858 (1929). Using dif-
ferent language the Supreme Court of Oklahoma stated that an
ordinance was not invalidated merely because the board was al-
lowed to determine what was worthy as distinquished from un-
worthy. Ex parte White, 56 Okla. Crim. Rep. 418, 41 P. 2d 488
(1935). An even more liberal attitude was shown in Ex Parte Wil-
liams, 345 Mo. 1121, 139 S.W. 2d 485 (1940), where the Supreme
Court of Missouri held it was not necessary that a rule of conduct
be prescribed where the power conferred was a police measure.
No federal question seems to have been raised. The Cantwell case,
supra, impliedly overruled these and other state court decisions
which authorized a prior restraint upon the exercise of the com-
mon right of solicitation by allowing a board to appraise facts,
form an opinion, and exercise judgment in determining whether
a permit should be granted.
The principal case, by following the Cantwell case, supra,
establishes the need in Ohio for at least a substantial relation be-
tween the permitted objective and the legislation regulating the
civil organization.
William F. Newman
CoRpoRiTIoxs - DOING BusINEss -
SOLICITATION ON TELEVISION BROADCAST
Plaintiff brought an action in Utah state court for injuries
caused by the use of a hair preparation manufactured by a foreign
corporation not registered under the incorporation laws of that
state. Process was served on the local television station manager
on the theory that since the defendant corporation had solicited
orders through the station, the corporation was "doing business"
within the meaning of the Utah statute. RULEs OF CrmV PRocEDunE,
Rule 4 (e) (4). All orders taken by the station when viewers called
the number shown on the screen were forwarded to the defendant,
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without additional charge, to be filled by C.O.D. shipments direct
to the purchaser. The lower court quashed the service of process
and plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court of Utah. Held, mere
solicitation on television by a foreign corporation did not consti-
tute "doing business" within the meaning of Utah Code of Civil
Procedure relating to service of process on a foreign corporation
doing business in that state. McGriff v. Charles Antell, Inc., Utah,
256 P. 2d 703 (1953).
At one time, a corporation had no legal existence outside the
state of incorporation, although it was subject to in rem jurisdiction
with respect to its property in another state. St. Clair v. Cox, 106
U. S. 350 (1882). Today, however, a foreign corporation may be
subjected to service of process under the doctrine that the corpora-
tion impliedly consents to service by "doing business" in the state.
Bank of America v. Whitney Bank, 261 U. S. 171 (1923).
The expression, "doing business" within a state, may have
one meaning when used in statutes which fix the conditions under
which a foreign corporation may be admitted to do business in a
state, and another meaning under statutes which provide for serv-
ing summons upon the managing agent of a foreign corporation
present in a state. Beach v. Kerr Turbine Co., 243 Fed. 706 (D.C.
Cir. 1917). Mere solicitation of business by an unregistered foreign
corporation is not "doing business" within the meaning of the
qualification statutes. Mandel Bros. v. Henry A. O'Neil, Inc., 69
F. 2d 452 (8th Cir. 1934).
As to what constitutes "doing business" for valid service of
process, the decisions are conflicting and unsatisfactory. However,
most states agree that mere solicitation does not constitute "doing
business" for purposes of service of process. Green v. Chicago,
Burlington and Cincinnati R.R., 205 U. S. 530 (1906); See Notes,
46 A.L.R. 572 (1927), 60 A.L.R. 1038 (1929). But some courts have
sustained the service of process where the solicitation was con-
tinuous and systematic. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U. S. 310 (1945). In Frene v. Louisville Cement Co., 134 F. 2d 511
(D.C. Cir. 1943), the court stated that, "In general the trend has
been toward a wider assertion of power over nonresidents and
foreign corporations than was considered permissible when the
tradition about 'mere solicitation' grew up .... It would seem,
therefore, that the 'mere solicitation' rule should be abandoned
when the soliciting activity is a regular, continuous and sustained
course of business...."
A different holding occurred in a case somewhat similar to
the principal case, Union Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. District Court of
Denver, 97 Colo. 108, 47 P. 2d 401 (1935). There a life insurance
company was advertising over the radio under a contract similar
to the one in the principal case, with the exception that the radio
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station received a commission on all policies sold. The Supreme
Court of Colorado held this activity to be within the scope of a
Colorado statute which provides that service may be had upon an
agent of a foreign corporation "doing business" in the state.
The Ohio law on the question of what constitutes "doing busi-
ness" in the state for purposes of service of process is also rather
uncertain. The Ohio courts have said that the service of process
statute, Onio REv. CODE § 2703.12, should be liberally construed
to facilitate the obtaining of jurisdiction over a foreign corporation
"doing business" in Ohio. Simonsen v. Gulf Refining Co., 23 Ohio
Op. 486 (1942); Bach v. Friden Calculating Mach. Co., 167 F. 2d.
679 (6th Cir. 1948). In the latter case, the court held that the fun-
damental principle underlying the "doing business" concept seems
to be the maintenance within the jurisdiction of a regular, continu-
ous course of business activities. This seems to adopt the rule of
Frene v. Louisville Cement Co., supra.
By the recent enactment of OIno REv. CODE § 1703.191 (1953),
Ohio has made it much easier to obtain personal jurisdiction once
the fact of "doing business" is established. This section provides
for service upon the Secretary of State as the agent of an un-
licensed foreign corporation doing business in Ohio.
How much the law will change in the next few years on the
question of what constitutes "doing business" is a matter of specu-
lation. The principal case merely reaffirmed the majority rule
which requires something more than "mere solicitation" for valid
service of process.
Howard Webster Bernstein
DOMESTIC RELATIONS - TnE EFFECT OF INCEST STATUTES ON THE
RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN MARRIAGES.
Respondent and decedent, his niece, who were domiciled in New
York, went to Rhode Island and were married. Marriages are per-
mitted in Rhode Island between Jewish people within the degrees of
affinity and consanguinity allowed by their faith. R. I. GEN. LAws,
c. 415, § 4. Shortly after the marriage, they returned to New York
where they resided until decedent's death. Petitioner, one of their
children, sought to be made administratix, contending the marriage
was void in New York because of statutes which prohibit marriage
and declare cohabitation a felony between persons of such a close
relationship. N. Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 5 (3); N. Y. PENAL LAW § 1110.
The Court of Appeals of New York affirmed a decree denying the
petition, holding that the marriage was valid for the reasons that
it was not repugnant to natural law and that the New York
statutes, supra, have no extraterritorial force. In re May's Estate,
305 N. Y. 486, 114 N.E. 2d 4 (1953).
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The law which will control in cases of this type is the conflict
of laws rule of the parties' domicile. GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS
(3d ed., 1949) p. 348. The most common conflict rule is that a
marriage valid where celebrated is valid everywhere, i.e., the
domestic law of the state of celebration will control. There are,
however, two exceptions to this rule. The first would declare the
marriage void if it is either polygamous or incestuous within the
degrees of consanguinity prohibited by the laws of Christendom
The second exception applies to statutes, based on strong public
policy, which expressly prohibit the marriage. Osoinach. v. Wat-
kins, 235 Ala. 564, 180 So. 577, 117 A.L.R. 179 (1938); Fensterwald
v. Burk, 129 Md. 131, 98 Atl. 358, 3 A.L.R. 1562 (1916); Cunning-
ham v. Cunningham, 206 N. Y. 341, 99 N.E. 845 (1913); RESTATz-
MEnT, CoNFLIcT OF LAWS § 132. In the absence of statutes, mar-
riages between persons in a direct line of consanguinity or immedi-
iate collaterals (brother and sister) would be declared incestuous
and void. Commonwealth v. Lane, 113 Mass. 458, 18 Am. Rep. 509
(1873). The "Law of Christendom" apparently is not the Bible,
because it would prohibit marriages between a nephew and his
aunt, although there is no prohibition on marriage between an
uncle and niece. LEvrcus, 18: 12, 13, 14; 20: 19, 20. The differ-
entiation may well be based on the view toward polygamy at the
time, wherein males were allowed multiple wives, but a woman
could have only one husband. The fourteenth verse of Chapter 18
of Leviticus which provides: "Thou shalt not uncover the naked-
ness of thy father's brother, thou shall not approach to his wife:
she is thine aunt" must be read as a whole, and is merely an af-
finity prohibition against marriage to the wife of an uncle.
The courts have split on the application of the second excep-
tion. One group would say that the statute must expressly declare
that it applies to foreign marriages before it can invalidate them.
In re May's Estate, supra; In re Miller's Estate, 239 Mich. 455, 214
N.W. 428 (1927). The other position is that if the statute represents
a strong policy of the jurisdiction, then foreign marriages in vio-
lation of the statute will be void, even if they are not covered by
the express terms of the statute. Osoinach v. Watkins, supra. This
split is applicable to incest statutes, even if the relationship is de-
clared to be a felony. In re May's Estate, supra. Statutes involving
the capacity of the parties to contract the marriage are the ones
with which the exception is concerned. On the other hand the
lex loci rule is applied almost unanimously to statutes dealing with
form and ceremony. Fensterwald v. Burk, supra. The proper inter-
pretation of the second exception would be to apply it only when
the statute expressly refers to foreign marriages because of the
desire to uphold the marriage if possible, the lack of relation of
domestic law of the domicile if the parties do not intend to return,
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the ease of'providing for this in a statute, and the ease of interpre-
tation such a provision would provide.
The lex loci rule has been severely criticized, because of the
complete irrelevance of the law of the place of celebration to the
parties who are not going to remain in that jurisdiction. CooK, LOGI-
CAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, c. XVII (1942). It
may be said, however, that this rule tends to uphold marriages, thus
alleviating the serious problems created by void marriages. The
exceptions to the rule present the most difficulty, but if the mar-
riage were only voidable if under one of the exceptions, the prob-
lem of void marriages would be met and still there would be a
method to dissolve marriages which are naturally abhorrent. Walk-
er v. Walker, 84 N.E. 2d 258 (1948).
There are various alternatives to the lex loci rule. One sug-
gestion is that the domestic law of the intended family domicile
should be controlling on the issue of validity of the marriage. Coox,
LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAws, c. XVII,
(1954). The underlying theory being that the only state with a
real interest in the marriage is where the parties will live during
coverture. This approach presents the problem of proving what was
to be the domicile, although this would probably be resolved before
an action arose. This approach offers no solution to the question of
the effect of the parties moving from the intended domicile, and
ignores the policy consideration of declaring the marriage valid if
at all possible. GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS, p. 358 (3d ed., 1949).
Some English and a few American cases would hold that the do-
mestic law of the spouses' domicile would control. Brook v. Brook,
9 H.L. Cas. 193, 11 Eng. Rep. 703 (1861); Weiss v. Weiss, 8 Pa. D.
& C. 534 (1926). This approach seems to have all the vices and none
of the virtues of the other suggested panaceas. STERmvBERG, PRINCI-
PLES OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, pp. 262-267 (1937); GOODRICH, CON-
FLICT OF LAWS, pp. 351-368 (3d ed. 1949); SELECTIONS FROm
BEALE's TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, §§121.21, 129.1, 132.5,
136.6, 133.1 (1935).
Eleven states and the District of Columbia have adopted stat-
utes which declare marriages void that are entered into by their
citizens to evade local laws. For example, see WIs. STAT. § 245.04
(1949). There was a Uniform Marriage Evasion Act, but it was
withdrawn from the active list in 1943 because so few states had
adopted it. These statutes distinguish between those who leave to
evade and plan to return; those who were validly married while
domiciled elsewhere and subsequently moved to the state; and
those residents who leave to get married but have no intention to
return. Very hard results may be reached under these statutes,
due to the fact the marriage is declared absolutely void. Meisen-
helder v. Chicago & N.W. R.R., 170 Minn. 317, 213 N.W. 32, 51
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A.L.R. 1408 (1927). The "evasion" type act, if limited to more seri-
ous defects in the marriage, might be a very valuable aid. W. VA.
CODE § 46966 (1949).
Eight states have incorporated the lex loci rule into their stat-
utes with either none or only part of the first exception. For ex-
ample: Baldwin's Ky. REv. STAT. §402.040 (Baldwin, 1943). These
states may have a serious problem of statutory interpretation. Rhode
Island and Georgia are the only states in which an uncle and niece
may be married, but in both states a nephew could not marry his
aunt. In Georgia, however, it does not appear that such marriages
would be limited to members of the Jewish faith. GEORGIA CODE
ANN. c. 53, §102. Most of the states have no affinity provisions, and
of those that do, several severely limit their effect, Back v. Back,
148 Iowa 223, 125 N. W. 1009 (1910); Noble v. State, 22 Ohio St.
541 (1872).
Ohio is rather indefinite on this point. Our statutes are very
similar to those in the case noted. OHIO REV. CODE §§3101.01 (8001-
1), 2905.07 (1302.3). An early Ohio case held that a man would
be guilty of incest even if he were married to his niece in a country
where such marriages were valid. State v. Brown, 47 Ohio St. 102,
23 N.E. 747 (1890). The later cases seem to express the same view.
Courtright v. Courtright et al., 11 Ohio Dec. Rep. 413; Heyse v.
Miclialske, 31 Ohio L. Abs. 484, 18 Ohio Op. 254, (1940).
The complete answer to the question here involved is uni-
formity of marriage laws. This is very unlikely to occur. Of the
various other approaches to the problem, I believe that the lex loci
rule with a provision that the marriage be voidable by public action
in extreme cases is the next best solution. The Ohio view is very
strict and should be changed to prevent the great injustices which
could arise in fact situations similiar to the principal case.
David W. Carroll
EVIDENCE- ADMISSIBILITY OF RADAR
EVIDENCE OF A VEHICLE'S SPEED
Defendant Moffitt was prosecuted for operating his automobile
at an unlawful rate of speed in Kent County, Delaware. The state's
evidence to substantiate its charge rested in part on a test made by
two highway troopers using an electronic radar speedmeter. Held,
an electronic radar speedmeter, if properly functioning and prop-
erly operated is a device that the jury may find to be a correct
recorder of speed of one charged with operating an automobile at
an unlawful rate. State v. Moffitt, 100 A. 2d 778 (Del. 1953).
For obvious reasons the admission of evidence derived from
the use of a radar speedmeter has been rarely questioned beyond
the trial court level. A convicted defendant is not likely to carry
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his case to a higher court to avoid paying a fine. Hence the legality
of such evidence can be measured only by examining the judicial
standards previously laid down for the use of other scientific de-
vices.
The dangers inherent in expert testimony grounded on scientif-
ic tests, especially where a jury is concerned, have resulted in the
rule that general scientific recognition of the accuracy of a device
is necessary for the admission of any evidence obtained by its use.
Frye v. United States, 293 Fed. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923); see Note, 34
A.L.R. 145 (1925). And the scientist rather than the court is con-
sidered best able to determine the soundness of any new apparatus.
State v. Bonner, 210 Wis. 651, 246 N.W. 314 (1933). Under this rule
evidence has been admitted as to fingerprinting. State v. Huffman,
209 N.C. 10, 182 S.E. 705 (1935), handwriting, In re Connor's Estate,
105 Neb. 88, 179 N.W. 401 (1920) and ballistics, Burchett v. State,
35 Ohio App. 463, 172 N.E. 557 (1930). Chemical analysis of body
fluids to determine intoxication is also generally admitted. Kirsch-
wing v. Farrar, 114 Colo. 421, 166 P. 2d 154 (1946). However, in
some instances, notably in the case of the lie detector, courts have
refused to find the necessary scientific recognition of accuracy al-
though much scientific data sustains its probative value. People v.
Becker, 300 Mich. 562, 2 N.W. 2d 503 (1942); and see Smallwood,
Lie Detectors: Discussions and Proposals, 29 CoRNELL L. Q. 535
(1944). Although radar is generally accepted for many purposes,
it remains to be seen if the appellate courts will sustain the recog-
nition accorded the radar speedmeter in State v. Moffitt, supra.
Whether a court accepts the accuracy of the speedmeter with-
out question or does so only after expert testimony on the point,
further problems may arise in sustaining conviction based upon
such evidence. Two of these difficulties, which were passed over
lightly at the trial court level of State v. Moffitt, supra, became
leading issues in a recent New York Supreme Court reversal of a
radar speedmeter conviction. People v. Offermann, 204 Misc. 769,
125 N.Y.S. 2d 179 (1953).
Scientific evidence must be introduced through an expert wit-
ness, Conley v. Commonwealth, 265 Ky. 78, 95 S.W. 2d 1094 (1936),
and the length and quality of training given a police officer in the
operation of the speedmeter raises some doubts as to his qualifica-
tions as expert witness. See comment, 30 N.C. L. REv. 385
(1952). According to State v. Moffitt, supra, the fact that the officer
making the test is not skilled in electronics should not render the
test inadmissible. Many courts may not be willing to go this far.
Certainly if the officer tries to testify beyond the bare facts of the
test, he may find himself disqualified. In People v. Offermann, supra,
the acting chief of the police department's radio division who had
been concerned with radio since 1910 but possessed no formal train-
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ing in radio or electronics was held not qualified to testify concern-
ing the accuracy of the device.
While the prosecution may not have to prove the general scien-
tific accuracy of the radar speedmeter, it must prove the accuracy
of the particular speedmeter used. State v. Moffitt, supra mentions
only that the speedmeter used had been tested within a reasonable
time from the date of its use and method of proof is not explained.
Direct testimony by the officers making the test would seem to be
the simplest method. However, in People v. Offermann, supra, the
testimony of the officer driving the police automobile used in test-
ing the radar device that the automobile speedometer agreed with
the reading of the device as relayed to him over a radio by the op-
erator of the device, and the testimony of the operator that the
device read the same as the speedometer reading relayed to him
by the other officer was held to be hearsay and improperly admit-
ted by the trial court.
Whether or not this testimony be regarded as hearsay, there
seems to be no valid reason for refusing to receive it in evidence.
Although officer A may no longer remember the speed he reported
to officer B, he is present and able to testify directly as to the cor-
rectness of that statement when he made it. B can testify directly
to the agreement between A's statement and his own speed read-
ing. The difficulty arises in B's testimony concerning A's report
to him. Clearly if B had made a written memorandum of A's speed
report, there would be no question that such memo supported by
the joint testimony of the two officers would be admissible. WIG-
moRE, EvN rE §751 (3rd ed. 1940). If the memo had later been
lost, B could testify to the contents from memory. Putnam v. Moore,
119 F. 2d 246 (5th Cir. 1941). The present case requires one step
further -B must depend on his memory alone to reproduce A's
statement. It is hard to see how this situation makes cross-exam-
ination more difficult or evaluation of the facts less reliable than in
the case of a lost memorandum. Shear v. Van Dyke, 10 Hun. 528
(N.Y. 1877); Hart v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 144 N.C. 91, 56
S.E. 559 (1907); Morgan, Hearsay and Preserved Memory, 40
H-Aav. L. R.v. 712 (1927); and see Note, 28 IowA L. Rm. 530
(1943).
In sustaining a conviction obtained through radar evidence, a
court must therefore be satisfied that a general scientific recogni-
tion of the device exists, be prepared to accept the "expert" testi-
mony of police operators and officers, and admit testimony which
approaches the realm of hearsay, - all of which makes a convic-
tion based on radar evidence less of a hopeless case than it appears
to the average defendant.
Mildred Mangum
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FEDERAL COURTS - VENUE - NON RESIDENT MOTORIST STATUTE
Plaintiff, an Illinois corporation, sued defendants, residents of
Indiana, in the United States District Court for the Western Dis-
trict of Kentucky for damages arising out of the operation of de-
fendant's truck in Kentucky. Service of process was made under
FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d) (7), which states that service upon any com-
petent person or upon a corporation is sufficient "if the summons
and complaint are served in the manner prescribed by the law of
the state which the service is made..." This was in accordance
with Ky. R V. STAT. §§188.020, 188.030 which provide for service
upon the Secretary of State in a civil action against non-resident
motorists arising out of the operation of a motor vehicle on the
highways of the state. The defendant's motion to dismiss upon
grounds of improper venue was overruled, and judgment was en-
tered for the plaintiffs. This judgment was affirmed by the court
of appeals and defendants appealed to the Supreme Court. Held,
reversed. Defendants are not Kentucky residents within the mean-
ing of the federal venue statute which confines such suits to "the
judicial district where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside." 28
U.S.C. § 1391 (a). The non-resident defendants did not waive their
federal venue privilege or voluntarily consent to suit by operating
a truck upon the Kentucky highways. In a dissenting opinion, Mr.
Justice Reed with the concurrence of Mr. Justice Minton stated
that the implied appointment of an agent for service of process in
the state courts was a waiver of the federal venue privilege. They
reasoned by analogy from Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding
Corp., Ltd., 308 U.S. 165 (1939) which held that the formal desig-
nation of an agent for service of process constituted a waiver of
federal venue. Obderling v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 345 U.S. 950 (1953).
The first modem non-resident motorist statute was enacted by
Massachusetts, MAss. GEN. LAws, c.90, as amended by 1923 MASs.
STAT., c. 431, § 2. In the event of an accident involving a resident and
non-resident of a state, provision was made for the service of proc-
ess on the Registrar of Motor Vehicles who would then send a copy
of the same by registered mail to the non-resident defendant. The
avowed purpose of the statute was to provide a reasonable method
for protecting persons and property within the state from injury
inflicted by non-residents who drive automobiles within the state.
See Scott, Jurisdiction Over Non-resident Motorists, 39 HAtv. L.
REv. 563 (1926).
It was early held that the presence of a person within the jur-
isdiction was required for a valid exercise of in personam juris-
diction. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878). However, the con-
titutionality of the non-resident motorist law was sustained in Hess
v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927), which stated that the use of the
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state highways by a non-resident was equivalent to his appointing
the state registrar his attorney for the service of process. A later
case added weight to this contention in holding that since the state
has the power to exclude a non-resident motorist altogether, it may
declare that the use of the highways is the equivalent to appointing
an officer as their agent. Penn. Fire Insurance Co. v. Gold Issue
Mining Co., 243 U.S. 93 (1917). It would seem that the true basis
of jurisdiction over the non-resident, however, is the driving of an
automobile within the jurisdiction which is considered a dangerous
act. Since this decision all of the states have adopted similar stat-
utes.'For a table of these acts see Note, 82 A.L.R. 769 (1933).
Many states have passed laws with provisions similar to those
of the non-resident motorist statutes affecting non-resident corpo-
rations. These laws provide that a non-resident doing business with-
in a state shall appoint an agent for the service of process. If an
agent is not appointed, the corporation by doing such business with-
in the state shall be deemed to have thereby appointed an officer
of the state as its agent for the service of process. See, eg. Omo REV.
CODE § 1703.191. The Neirbo case, supra, held that a designation by
a foreign corporation, in conformity with a valid statute of a state
and as a condition of doing business within it, of an agent upon
whom service of process could be made was an effective consent
to be sued in the federal courts of the state. The court in Knott
Corporation v. Furman, 163 F. 2d 199 (4th Cir. 1947), cert. denied,
332 U.S. 809 (1947), went even further, stating that "the consent to
suit and service of process implied from doing business in a state
by a foreign corporation not only authorizes a suit in the courts
of the state, with service of process upon designated state officers,
but also waives the provisions of the federal venue statute so that
suit can be brought in federal court if elements of federal juris-
diction are present." Although it would seem that the actual con-
stitutional basis of the in personam jurisdiction was the activity
of the corporation within the state, the court grounded its opinion
on the theory of an implied consent.
This consent theory, though denounced as being a legal fiction
by many writers and judges, (Ftexner v. Farson, 248 U.S. 289, 293
(1919), was the basis for nearly all of the United States District
Court decisions holding the federal venue privilege to be waived
under the non-resident motorist statute. Steele v. Dennis, 62 F.
Supp. 73 (D. Md. 1945). Urso v. Sealers, 90 F. Supp. 653 (E.D.
Penn. 1950); Morris v. Sun Oil Co., 88 F. Supp. 529 (D. Md. 1950).
The gist of the consent theory seems to be that the operation of a
vehicle on the highways of the state is a voluntary act performed
by the non-resident motorist manifesting "consent" to be sued as
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part of a bargain by which the motorist is permitted to use the high-
ways within the state.
The federal courts of appeals have failed to follow this consent
theory. They theorize that the basis of the state's jurisdiction is
either the power to exclude the motorist or its general police power.
Regardless of the theory, the act of driving in the state is a suf-
ficient basis for exercising jurisdiction, and the implication of con-
sent is deemed neither necessary nor accurate. Since no consent to
be sued in the state is found to exist, the party is not held to have
waived the federal venue statute and therefore must be sued in the
district where either he or the plaintiffs reside. Martin v. Fischback
Trucking Co., 183 F. 2d 53 (1st Cir. 1950); McCoy v. Silver, 205 F.
2d 498 (1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 872 (1953).
.Logically, it would seem that this latter view, adopted by the
Supreme Court in the present case, is the better one. This position
recognizes that the actual basis for the exercise of the jurisdiction
is the activity within the state, and disregards the theory of a fic-
tional consent to jurisdiction. From the practical point of view, how-
ever, the fictional waiver of venue has been followed with desirable
results. The litigation could be settled much more expeditiously in
the district courts of the state where the accident occurred. The
ideal solution would seem to be appropriate federal legislation
amending the federal venue statute.
Robert Hill
LIMITATION OF AcTIOs - QuAsiI Ix REM PROCEEDING
EFFECT OF SAVING STATUTE
The plaintiff brought an action against Standard Drug Com-
pany for personal injuries sustained from using a compound manu-
factured by The Toni Company and sold to the plaintiff by Stand-
ard Drug Company. Over two years after the injury, the plaintiff
filed an amended petition naming The Toni Company as a new de-
fendant and several retail stores as garnishees. Since the defendant,
The Toni Company, was a foreign corporation not licensed or au-
thorized to do business in Ohio, service of summons by publication
was initiated and an affidavit of attachment was filed to attach as-
sets in the jurisdiction of the court belonging to the defendant but
in the possession of the retail stores. By special appearance, the
defendant moved to quash the service of summons and to dismiss
the petition on the grounds that the action had not been com-
menced within the two year period prescribed in OHIO REV. CODE
§2305.10 (11224-1) and that the facts did not bring the case within
the saving statute, Okto REV. CODE §2305.15 (11228). This statute
provides that "When a cause of action accrues against a person, if
he is out of the state... the period of limitation for commencement
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of the action... does not begin to run until he comes into the
state..." The common pleas court quashed the service of summons,
entered judgment for the defendant and discharged the attachment.
The court of appeals reversed and remanded with instructions to
vacate the order. On appeal the Supreme Court held: (1) that
OIUo REV. CODE § 2305.15 (11228) applied to corporations; and (2)
that this statute was applicable to a quasi in rem attachment pro-
ceeding which was incidental to an action in personam. Moss v.
Standard Drug Co. 159 Ohio St. 464, 112 N.E. 2d 542 (1953).
At common law the term "person" prima facie included both
natural and artificial persons and therefore included corporations.
Department of Highways v. Lykes Bros. S. S. Co., 209 La. 381, 24
So. 2d 623 (1945); 13 AM. Jun., Corporations §9. This rule has
been adopted by statutory enactment in Ohio. Orno REv. CODE
§1.02 (10213). The Ohio courts have also construed "persons" to
include corporations where such a construction is consistent with
the legislative intent. Cincinnati Gaslight and Coke Co. v. Avon-
dale, 43 Ohio St. 257, 1 N.E. 527 (1885); Ohio Farmers Ins. Co. v.
Hard, 59 Ohio St. 248, 52 N.E. 635 (1898).
In an action on a cognovit note after the fifteen year statute of
limitations had expired, the court decided that the statute of limi-
tations was suspended during the defendant's absence from the
state, in spite of the fact that the plaintiff could have taken a
cognovit judgment on the note at any time. Commonwealth Loan
Co. Inc. v. Firestine, 148 Ohio St. 133, 73 N.E. 2d 501 (1947). The
court reasoned that had the legislature intended to remove such
causes of action from the operation of the saving statute they could
have done so by appropriate language. In other recent cases the
court has construed OHio REV. CODE §2305.15 (11228) literally and
has refused to read exceptions into the statute. Couts v. Rose, 152
Ohio St. 458, 90 N.E. 2d 139 (1950); Meekison v. Groschner, 153
Ohio St. 301, 91 N.E. 2d 680 (1950). In the Couts case, supra, the
plaintiff was injured in Ohio by defendant, a non-resident motorist.
The plaintiff could have brought an action against the defendant
in Ohio under the provisions of the Ohio non-resident motorist stat-
ute, Oino REV. CODE §2703.20 (6308-1). Nevertheless, the court held
that the plaintiff did not have to bring the action within two years
after the injury but could rely on Omo Rav. CODE §2305.15 (11228).
The majority of American courts have held, in the absence of
express statutory provisions to the contrary, that where the defend-
ant was absent from the state the statute of limitations should be
suspended regardless of whether the action is in personam, quasi
in rem or in rem. Thus the statute has been tolled although the de-
fendant had property within the state which could have been sub-
jected to attachment or garnishment during the statutory period.
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See Note, 119 A.L.R. 337 (1939). But in an Ohio case, the statement
appears in the opinion (although not carried into the syllabus) that
the saving statute applies only to actions in personam. Crandall v.
Irwin, 139 Ohio St. 253, 39 N.E. 2d 608 (1942). This was an action to
foreclose a mechanic's lien on real estate, an action in rem. The
court held that the six year limitation prescribed in OHIO REv. CODE
1311.13 (8321), extinguished the right, and not merely the remedy,
and that the saving statute applied only to limitations contained in
the general limitations of actions chapter, Omo GEN. CODE §§11.218
to 11236 inclusive, now Omo REV. CODE §§ 2305.04 to 2305.14 inclu-
sive and 1307.08.
In the instant case, the Supreme Court rejected the contention
that the action was in rem and that therefore the saving statute was
not applicable. The court in the principal case distinguished the
Crandall case, supra, by holding that the attachment proceeding
was a quasi in rem action rather than an in rem proceeding. The
statement in the Crandall case, supra, to the effect that Omo REV.
CODE § 2305.15 (11228) applies only to actions in personam, wheth-
er it be regarded as dictum or as an alternative ground of decision,
seems directly opposed to the position taken later by the Supreme
Court in the Firestine, Meekison and Couts cases, supra. These
three cases hold that no exceptions should be read into the saving
statute, OHIO REV. CODE 2305.15 (11228). By distinguishing the
Crandall case, supra, the Supreme Court refused to extend the
doctrine of that case. Instead, it continued the approach of the
Firestine, Meekison and Couts cases, supra. By its decision in the
instant case, the Supreme Court has moved closer to a complete
adoption of the majority American rule.
Carl V. Bruggeman
LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW- ZONING ORDINANCE
CONSTITUTIONALITY
By an ordinance, the Village of Mayfield Heights prohibited
absolutely the removal of topsoil from land located in areas desig-
nated as higher use districts. An action was brought by a dealer in
topsoil challenging the constitutionality of the ordinance. While the
suit was pending, the village council repealed the law prohibiting
removal and enacted in lieu thereof a law merely regulating topsoil
removal. To comply with this ordinance it was necessary, inter alia,
to post a bond of five hundred dollars for each acre of land to be
stripped, and to provide for drainage, reseeding, and payment of
inspection expenses incurred by the village. Before a permit would
be granted, it was provided that the building inspector should in-
vestigate the application and report his findings to a board of zoning
appeals, who upon a fayorable determination would grant a permit.
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Thereafter, plaintiff filed a supplemental petition similarly attack-
ing the amended ordinance. Held, the ordinance does not violate
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution as the restriction is reasonably related to the
protection of the health, safety and welfare of the village. Miesz v.
Mayfield Heights, 92 Ohio App. 471, 111 N.E. 2d 20 (1953).
Municipal corporations have power to enact zoning ordinances
under the authority of state constitutional provisions and statutes
delegating police power to them. Rozeval Realty Co. v. Klienert,
268 U.S. 646 (1932); Synod of Ohio v. Joseph, 139 Ohio St. 299, 39
N.E. 2d 515 (1942); McCord v. Ed Bond Co., 175 Ga. 667, 165 S.E.
590 (1943).
The issue in each case involving the validity of a zoning ordi-
nance is whether the restraint upon the use of the land is a reason-
able interference with the owner's rights. Pittsfield v. Oleksak, 313
Mass. 543, 47 N.E. 2d 930 (1943); see Note, 168 A.L.R. 1188 (1947);
see also John McCarthy, Legal Background of Zoning in Ohio, 23
Omo BAR 563, for a review of Ohio cases. If an ordinance promotes
the convenience or the general welfare of a relatively large portion
of the population, or has a tendency directly or indirectly to ad-
vance the public interest, it is said to be within the police power of
the municipality. Bacon v. Walker, 204 U. S. 311 (1907); Pritz v.
Messer, 112 Ohio St. 628, 149 N.E. 30 (1925). Nevertheless, great
financial loss should not be inflicted where the benefit to a large
segment of society is negligible. Pittsfield v. Oleksak, supra; West
Bros. Brick Co. v. Alexander, 169 Va. 271, 192 S.E. 881 (1937);
Terrace Park v. Evertt 12 F. 2d 240 (6th Cir. 1926), cert. denied,
243 U.S. 710 (1926). In the Terrace Park case, supra, an ordinance,
which prohibited the removal of gravel from land that was unfit
for residential purposes due to passing trains and a nearby rubbish
dump, was overthrown on constitutional grounds. The value of
the land for use as a gravel pit was about ten times greater than
for any other purpose to which it could be put.
The constitutionality of an ordinance regulating the removal of
topsoil was raised in Ohio for the first time in the instant case.
However, the lower courts of New York considered this question
in Lizza v. Town of Hempstead, 175 Misc. 383, 23 N.Y.S. 2d 811
(1947); Lizza v. Town of Hempstead, 272 App. Div. 921, 71 N.Y.S.
2d 14 (1947); Burroughs Landscape Co. v. Town of Oyster Bay,
186 Misc. 123, 16 N.Y.S. 2d 123 (1946). In the earlier Town of
Hempstead case, supra, a zoning law prohibited the taking of soil
from land within the town, a suburban residential district, to any
place outside the county wherein Hempstead is located. But it per-
mitted soil to be removed from one place to another within the
town and county. The court was of the opinion that this ordinance
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was invalid as denying equal protection of law. In the second
Hempstead case, supra, and the Oyster Bay case, supra, the munici-
palities had ordinances much like that of Mayfield Heights in the
principal case. They provided that soil could not be removed be-
low a certain depth, and required drainage provisions and reseed-
ing, plus posting of a performance bond. The courts looked to the
residential nature of the towns, along with the additional burden
on the drainage system during rains, the dust in dry periods, and
the unsightly conditions left by improper soil removal to find the
required reasonable relationship between the ordinances and the
protection of the common weal. The Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts in Burlington v. Dunn, 318 Mass. 216, 61 N.E. 2d
243, 168 A.L.R. 1181 (1945), upheld an ordinance which completely
prohibited the removal of topsoil in the town of Burlington, a resi-
dential district of Boston.
Although the ordinances regulating the removal of topsoil are
of relatively recent origin, they are new only as to their subject
matter. They do not seem to represent an exertion of a new or
arbitrary power by municipalities. The courts in deciding the
validity of ordinances controlling topsoil removal take into con-
sideration the effect such removal will have upon the public wel-
fare due to the creation of unsightly areas, reduction of adjoining
real estate values and thus a reduction in tax revenues, the effect
upon the drainage systems, the danger to health due to standing
water, and the possibility of dust storms. If topsoil removal should
go uncontrolled these conditions might result in a substantial
harm to the welfare of the general public. Where it is found that
an ordinance will reduce or prevent these conditions, there seems
to be the necessary public interest involved to validate the de-
privation of the rights of the landowner and it is reasonable to
assume that such an ordinance will be held constitutional.
Kenneth R. Callahan
PERSONAL PROPERTY - ALTERNATIVE BANK AccoUNTs -
RIGHT OF Sumwvvonsmp
A married woman deposited fifteen thousand dollars of her
own money in a savings and in a checking account, retaining the
passbooks herself. In both instances, the bank had contracted to
permit either the husband "or" the wife to make withdrawals.
Neither account had been drawn upon at the time the husband
murdered his wife. An action was brought in the common pleas
court by the father and sole heir of the murdered woman to enjoin
payment by the bank to the husband from either account. The
common pleas court ruled that the husband was entitled to one-
half of the balance of these accounts at the time of his wife's death.
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On appeal, held reversed. The husband has no property rights in
these accounts. Bauman v. Walter, 160 Ohio St. 273, 116 N.E. 2d
435 (1953).
The account in the principal case was distinguished from that
of a joint account and a joint account coupled with a survivorship
provision. The obligation of the bank in the present case was to
pay the husband or the wife; it was not an obligation to pay the
husband and the wife, as in a joint account. The court stated that
the use of the word "or" denoted the intention to establish not
joint accounts, but the intention to create rights in the alternative.
In an earlier discussion of bank accounts in the alternative
it was stated that these deposits are construed primarily in one
of three ways. See Note, 6 OHio ST. L.J. 191 (1940). The first
theory is that the depositor, the original owner of the money, does
not intend a transfer of a property interest through the creation
of an account, although the other party can withdraw from the
account. Thus, if it were admitted that the husband in the principal
case had as much right to withdraw from the accounts after the
wife's death as he had before, then he could not be enjoined, and
the plaintiff's only remedy would be to withdraw the balance be-
fore the husband does. But the court indicated that the husband's
right was cut off at the death of the wife citing Smith v. Planters'
Savings Bank, 124 S.C. 100, 117 S.E. 312 (1923), noted in 33 YALE
L.J. 93 (1923), which held that the right of the non-contributor to
withdraw was only a power of attorney and hence was revoked on
the death of the donor. Under this view, the court properly en-
joined the defendant from withdrawing the accounts.
The second possible interpretation is that the intent of the de-
positor is to give to the other party the right of withdrawal upon
the death of the depositor, but not to give him such right during
the depositor's lifetime. If the transaction under this view is looked
upon as an attempt to transfer property as by will, as it was in
Schmitt v. Schmitt 39 Ohio' App. 219, 177 N.E. 418 (1928), it un-
questionably fails to comply with the statute of wills. And even if it
did not fail in this respect, the husband in the present case could
not take under a will because of his murderer's disability. Omo
REv. CODE § 2105.19. If the relationship between the bank and the
survivor is viewed, however, as a contract based on a condition
precedent of survival, the survivor could properly take under the
account. In a case in which the account "to A or to B" it was held
that although B had not had the right of withdrawal during A's
lifetime, B was entitled to the balance at A's death, because A had
established a contract relationship between the bank and B. Dunn
v. Houghton, 51 Atl. 71, (N.J. Eq. 1902). See Rowley, Living
Testamentary Dispositions, 3 U. Or CiN. L. REV. 361, 388 (1929).
Although incidental survivorship to a joint tenancy does not exist
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in Ohio, the same effect may be reached through contract by pro-
viding for the right of survivorship to the surviving joint owner.
In Re Estate of Hutchinson, 120 Ohio St. 542, 166 N.E. 687 (1929).
See Martin, The Incident of Survivorship in Ohio, 3 Omo ST. L.J.
48, 59 (1936).
The third possible view is that the depositor intends to create
not only a present property interest in the account, but also the
right of survivorship. An account of this nature is one which may
be stated "to A or B and the balance payable at the death of
either to the survivor." In such an instance the intent to create
survivorship is readily apparent. Cleveland Trust Co. v. Scobie,
114 Ohio St. 241, 151 N.E. 273, (1926). A more difficult situation,
however, was encountered in the case of In Re Estate of Fulk, 136
Ohio St. 233, 24 N.E. 2d 1020 (1940). There the supreme court
allowed parol evidence to clarify an ambiguity as to the intent
of creating survivorship in an account stated solely "to A or to
B." But in that case a couple married over a period of fifty years
had both deposited in the account, and the testimony clearly re-
vealed that the intent of the parties was to create survivorship.
To reach the result of survivorship in the Fulk case, supra, it is
obvious that the court had to look beyond the plain meaning of
the words to find the intent. It is also noteworthy that in a recent
case the supreme court indicated again that the form of deposit is
not a conclusive factor in determining ownership in a bank ac-
count. Union Properties, Inc. v. Cleveland Trust Co., 152 Ohio St.
430, 89 N.E. 2d 638 (1949). For a more comprehensive treatment
of this third position, see Note, 6 OMo ST. L.J. 191 (1940).
In the preceding paragraph we saw that the contract with the
bank in the instant case did not provide a right of survivorship;
thus the interest of the wife in these accounts was still intact at
her death. The possibility of an inter vivos gift was ruled out by
the court on the basis that the passbooks had not been delivered,
although in an earlier case it was stated that the exclusive posses-
sion by the donor of the passbook is not conclusive. Sage v. Flueck,
132 Ohio St. 377, 7 N.E. 2d 802 (1937). Here the supreme court
might be subject to criticism for failing to distinguish the nature
of the two accounts involved. Customarily, a gift of the funds in a
checking account is made by writing a check payable to the donee
or by withdrawing the funds and giving them to the donee. The
possession of the passbook to the checking account would not seem
to be a significant indicia of a gift. However, the passbook is
normally needed to make withdrawals from a savings account.
Another possible theory which the court rejected because of lack
of consideration was that of the wife's having passed her interest
to her husband through a contract between them. All of the
theories herein discussed lead to the conclusion that the wife's
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interest had not been extinguished by her death and the husband
had acquired no right to the balance of these accounts.
The decision of the court in the instant case is consistent with
its previous decisions in recognizing that the controlling factor in
determining the legal consequences of a bank account is its express
wording, and that only in an extreme case will the court go beyond
the plain meaning of the words. The facts of the principal case
do not seem to justify going beyond the language of the account,
as was done in the Fulk case, supra. It would appear that there
must be cogent reason for imputing any intent beyond that ex-
pressly stated in the account; ordinarily if survivorship is desired
it is specifically provided.
Charles R. Leech, Jr.
PERSONAL PROPERTY-ExEMPT FRoM ADuMSTRATION-
MuRDERER'S DisABnLITY TO TAKE
After the defendant was convicted of the murder of his wife,
the father and sole heir of decedent joined the administrator and
the husband in an action seeking a finding that the husband was
not entitled to twenty-five hundred dollars as property exempt
from the administration of the estate pursuant to OIo GEN. CODE
§ 10509-54. This section provided that if a person died leaving a
surviving spotise, such survivor could select certain personal prop-
erty, or money in lieu thereof, of the deceased to be free from
administration as part of the estate. Both the probate court and the
court of appeals sustained the defendant's demurrer to plaintiff's
petition. On appeal, held, OIo GEm. CODE § 10503-17 precluded the
husband from taking the set-off. Bauman v. Hogue, 160 Ohio St.
296, 116 N.E. 2d 439 (1953).
Prior to the adoption of OHro GEN. CODE § 10503-17, the Su-
preme Court of Ohio had upheld a decision which allowed an only
son who had murdered his mother to take from the mother by
descent and distribution. Deem v. Millikin, 53 Ohio St. 668, 44 N.E.
1134 (1895). The legislature prevented this from occurring again
by the enactment of OHo GE. CODE § 10503-17 in 1932. The por-
tion of that section applicable here reads:
"... no person finally adjudged guilty.... of murder ....
shall be entitled to inherit or take any part of the real or
personal estate of the person killed, whether under this
act relating to intestate succession or as devisee or
legatee, or otherwise under the will of such person..."
The interpretation of the phrase "..... whether under this act re-
lating to intestate succession...." has been the trouble maker.
The lower courts dealt with this statute in Egelhoff v. Presler,
32 Ohio Op. 252, 44 Ohio L. Abs. 376 (1945) and Tyack v. Tipton,
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65 Ohio L Abs. 397, 105 N.E. 2d 29 (1951). In the Egeihoff case,
supra, a minor was adjudged guilty of the murder of his father.
Here, the court interpreted "relating to intestate succession" to
mean by descent and distribution. The court said that OHIo GEN.
CODE § 10509-54 was obviously not within the purview of the re-
striction in that it did not appear in the chapter of the code entitled
Descent and Distribution.
The court of appeals in the Tyack case, supra, considered the
right of a husband, convicted of the murder of his wife, to take
the exemption statute. In reaching a result similar to that in the
Egelhoff case, supra, the court said, "If a stricter rule is desired
it must come from the legislature and not from the Courts."
However, the court in the principal case said that a right of
intestate succession to a decedent's property is one which depends
entirely upon the provisions of the law as distinguished from the
provisions of a will. The court put it this way: "The words 'pro-
visions of this act relating to intestate succession' ... necessarily
include the provisions for a surviving spouse set forth in Section
10509-54, General Code. It is true that the so-called statutes of
descent and distribution do relate 'to intestate succession.' It does
not follow, as defendant argues, that a statute such as Section
10509-54, General Code, does not relate."
Although a final decision was rendered in the case being noted
after the Ohio Revised Code became effective on October 1, 1953,
it had reached the courts before the effective date of the revision
and was thus decided under the Ohio General Code provision.
The words of OIo GEN. CODE § 10503-17 "... under this act relat-
ing to intestate succession..." have been changed by OHto REv.
CODE § 2105.19 to read "... under § 2105.01 to 2105.21, of the re-
vised code..." These sections include only the statutes pertaining
to descent and distribution.
Were it not for the change in the wording of the murderer's
disability statute by the adoption of the Ohio Revised Code, it
would seem that the question of the right of a murderer to take
under the exemption statute, new OHIo REv. CODE § 2115.13, would
become a settled point on the strength of the supreme court de-
cision in the principal case. Although a supreme court decision
had not been rendered on the point at the time of the reenactment,
the interpretation of the provision by the lower courts in the
Egelhoff and Tyack cases was fairly clear. Thus it would seem
plausible to argue in a future case that the legislature intended
to adopt this prior interpretation. The change in the wording of
the statute to make it read as it had been interpreted would seem
to support this view. On the other hand, the principal case is an
authoritative decision as to the meaning of Oino GEN. CODE
§ 10503-17 and OHIo REV. CODE § 1.24 says the intent of the legis-
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lature was not to change the law as expressed by the Ohio Gen-
eral Code. The firmly grounded policy against murderers benefit-
ing from their crimes along with the principal case as a precedent
will undoubtedly bear heavily upon a future court and will possibly
prevent the adoption of such a view.
Kenneth R. Callahan
ToRTs - AUTomoBILES - ImPUTATION OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
Plaintiffs permitted their son, under 18 years old, to drive
their automobile. The Delaware Statute, 21 DEL. REv. CODE § 6106
(1935), reads "Every owner of a motor vehicle who... knowingly
permits a minor under... 18 to drive such vehicle... shall be joint-
ly and severally liable with such minor for any damage caused
by the negligence of such minor in driving such vehicle." As a
result of the concurring negligence of the defendant and the plain-
tiff's son, the plaintiffs' car was wrecked; plaintiffs sued to re-
cover for property damage. Defendant contended that the son's
contributory negligence is imputed to the plaintiffs thus barring
recovery under 21 DEL. REv. CODE § 6106. Plaintiffs moved to strike
this defense. Held, motion granted. The court felt that the im-
putation of a minor's negligence to an owner under this statute
is applicable only in actions brought by a third person against the
owner. Westergren v. King, 99 A. 2d 356 (Sup. Ct. of Del. 1953).
At common law, the owner-bailor of an automobile was not
liable for the negligence of another whom he permitted to drive,
Williamson v. Eclipse Motor Lines, 145 Ohio St. 467, 62 N.E. 2d
239, 168 A.L.R. 1356 (1945); McElrath v. Luardo, 33 Ohio L. Abs.
279, 19 Ohio Op. 460 (1939); Edwards v. Benedict, 79 Ohio App.
134, 70 N.E. 2d 471, (1946); see Grant v. Knepper, 245 N.Y. 158,
156 N.E. 650, 54 A.L.R. 845 (1927); see Priestly v. Skourap, 142
Kan. 127, 45 P. 2d 451 (1935); Note, 100 A.L.R. 916 (1936); Note,
36 A.L.R. 1128 (1925); see CYCLOPEDIA OF AUTO LAW AwD PRACTICE
§ § 2865 and 2911. Therefore, the owner could recover from negli-
gent third persons although the driver was also negligent. Victor
Tea Co. v. Walsh, 9 Ohio L. Abs. 298, 176 N.E. 585 (1931); Readnour
v. Cincinnati Street Railway Co., 79 Ohio App. 345, 71 N.E. 2d
533 (1946); Curie v. Tyfe, - Ohio App. -, 105 N.E. 2d 428 (1951);
contra, Rose v. Baker 139 Tex. 554, 160 S.W. 2d 515 (1942). How-
ever, if the negligent driver were the owner's agent or servant,
Denison v. McNorton, 228 Fed. 401, 142 C.C.A. 631 (1916), or if the
owner knew the driver was incompetent, the owner would be
liable to an injured third party for the damage caused by the
driver, Elliott v. Harding, 107 Ohio St. 501, 104 N.E. 338 (1923);
Cunningham v. Bell, 149 Ohio St. 103, 77 N.E. 2d 918 (1948), and
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also the owner would be barred from recovering from the negli-
gent third person. See Elliott v. Harding, supra.; Cunningham v.
Bell, supra.
The trend is to modify this common law rule in order to assure
relief for injured parties against financially irresponsible drivers
who are neither agents nor servants of the owner. See CYCLOPEDIA OF
AUTO LAW AND PRACTICE § 2912; RESTATEMENT, TORTS, § 485 (b).
The family purpose doctrine, which allows the injured third party
to recover from the head of the household for the negligent driving
of his family, has been one device to insure financial responsibility.
Canning v. Cunningham, 322 Mich. 182, 33 N.W. 2d 752, (1948).
Some states still follow this doctrine. See Note, 36 A.L.R. 1141; 9
GA. B.J. 98 (1946); 10 GA. B.J. 222 (1947); 20 TENN. L. REv. 376
(1948); 1 KAN. L. REV. 368 (1953); CYCLOPEDIA OF AUTO LAW AND
PRACTICE, § § 3091 and 3111. Ohio does not follow the family pur-
pose doctrine. Elms v. Flick, 100 Ohio St. 186, 126 N.E. 66 (1919);
Bretzfelder v. Demaree, 102 Ohio St. 105, 130 N.E. 505 (1921).
Many states have passed statutes to insure financial responsi-
bility for irresponsible drivers. See Comment, 45 Harv. L. Rev. 171
(1931). (1) Some states declare the owner liable for the negligence
of any driver whom he knowingly permits to drive. McKinney's
N.Y. VER. & TiA. LAw § 59; l=Mn. STAT. AmN. § 170.54, R.I.
GEN. LAws c. 1429, § 10. (1929). (2) Others say any owner who
knowingly permits a minor below a certain age to drive shall be
liable for any damage caused by the minor's negligence. 21 DEL.
REv. CODE § 6106 (1935) (age 18); IowA CODE § 5026 (1927) (age
15); KAN. GEN. CODE § 8-222 (1949) (age 16). (3) Still other
statutes require a parent or guardian to sign a minor's applica-
tion for an operator's license when the minor is below a certain
age and provide that any negligence of the minor will be imputed
to the person who signed. Orno REV. CODE § 4507.07 (6296-10b)
(age 18); Wis. STAT. §§ 85.089 and 85.0810 (age 18); CAL. VEH.
CODE §§ 350 and 352 (age 21).
It is well established that the import of these statutes is to
make the owner liable when sued by the injured third person.
See Note, 135 A.L.R. 481 (1941); Note, 61 A.L.R. 884 (1929);
Note, 112 A.L.R. 427 (1938); CYCLOPEDIA OF AUTO LAW AmT PRAC-
TICE, § 3092.
However, when there is concurring negligence between the
third person and the driver of the owner or parent's car and when
the owner or parent subsequently sues the third person, a new
problem arises which apparently was not foreseen by most legis-
latures. The question is this: Does the language employed in the
statute not only make the owner liable to third persons for the
driver's negligence, but also preclude the owner from recovering
against negligent third persons when the driver has been guilty
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of contributory negligence? There seem to be two conflicting
views. One view interprets the statute narrowly and allows re-
covery as did the principal case. Webber v. Graves, 234 App. Div.
579, 255 N.Y.S. 726 (1932); Mills v. Gabriel, 259 App. Div. 60, 18
N.Y.S. 2d 78, affirmed, 284 N.Y. 755, 31 N.E. 2d 512 (1940);
Kernan v. Webb, 50 R.I. 394, 148 Atl. 186; Pancoast v. Co-operative
Cab. Co., 37 So. 2d 452 (App. La. 1948); Jacobson v. Dailey, 288
Minn. 201, 36 N.W. 2d 711, 11 A.L.R. 2d 1429, 1437 (1949). There
are several reasons given for this view: The legislature only in-
tended to protect the public by assuring financial responsibility for
irresponsible drivers; the legislature intended to make owners or
parents mere insurers and not principals of the drivers; statutes
in derogation of common law should be strictly construed.
The other view interprets the statute broadly and bars the
owner or parent from recovery. Milgate v. Wraith, 19 Cal. 2d 297,
121 P. 2d 10 (1942); Fox v. Schuster, 50 Cal. App. 2d 362, 123 P.
2d 56 (1942); National Trucking and Storage Co. v. Driscoll, 64 A.
2d 304 (Mun. Ct., D.C. 1949); Secure Finance Co. v. Chicago, R.I.
& Pac. Ry., 207 Iowa 1105, 224 N.W. 88, 61 A.L.R. 885 (1929);
Kirk v. United Public Gas Service, 165 So. 735 allowed recovery,
reversed, 185 La. 580, 170 So. 1 (1936); DiLeo v. Montier, 195 So.
74 (1940); Scheibe v. Town of Lincoln, 233 Wis. 425, 271 N.W. 47
(1937) (comparative negligence doctrine); Flaggs v. Johansen, 124
N.J.L. 456, 12 Atl. 2d 374 (1940). These courts base this view on
these reasons: It was the legislative intent to make the owner or
parent responsible for all negligence of the driver; that a principal-
agency relationship was created; that if the negligence of the
operator is imputable to the owner in actions by third parties
against owners, the converse must be true, that is, the negligence
of the operator will be imputable to the owner in actions by the
owner against third parties.
There seems to be no Ohio case in point. However, it is to be
noted that the language of Omo REv. CODE § 4507.07 (6296-10b)
seems broad enough to impute all negligence, including contribu-
tory negligence, to the signer of a minor's application. The statute
reads "Any negligence... of a minor under 18... when driving a
motor vehicle upon a highway shall be imputed to the person who
signed the application..., which person shall be jointly and sever-
ally liable with such minor for any damage caused by such negli-
gence .... ." On the other hand, when this provision is read in con-
text'with all of Omo REV. CODE § 4507 (6296-10) whose third para-
graph provides for a method of releasing the signer of the appli-
cation from his burden if proof of the minor's financial responsi-
bility is filed with the Registrar of Motor Vehicles, the legislative
intent seems merely to insure financial responsibility and not to
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create a principal-agency relationship between minor and signer
by which contributory negligence will be imputed to bar the
signer's recovery against a negligent third party. California and
Wisconsin, with statutory provisions very similar to Ohio's, bar
recovery. Fox v. Schuster, supra; Milgate v. Wraith, supra; Scheibe
v. Town of Lincoln, supra.
While not affecting the instant suit, yet interesting to note,
the Delaware Legislature subsequent to its instigation, added these
words to 21 DEL. REV. CODE § 6106 "and the negligence of such
minor shall be imputed to such owner for all purposes of civil
damages" (italics added), thus probably barring the owner's re-
covery against negligent third persons if the question arises in
the future in Delaware.
Thor G. Ronemus
STATE TAXATION - INTANGIBLE PERSONAL PROPERTY -
SITus OF ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE
Taxpayer, a resident Ohio corporation, owned accounts re-
ceivable which arose out of business transacted outside of Ohio
but which were not used in business outside of Ohio. These re-
ceivables were not returned by the taxpayer for Ohio intangible
personal property tax, and the Tax Commissioner of Ohio made a
deficiency assessment. On appeal to the Ohio Board of Tax Ap-
peals, the order of the Commissioner was affirmed with one mem-
ber dissenting. Held, reversed. Rule 224, as amended in 1953, which
subjected accounts receivable of domestic corporations arising
from business transacted outside of the state to intangible prop-
erty tax unless also used in business transacted outside the state,
was in conflict with the prior interpretation of Ohio's taxation
statute. Thus, the rule is invalid as to the requirement that such
accounts receivable must be used in business transacted outside the
state to be exempt from the Ohio tax. The Hoover Co. v. Peck,
160 Ohio St. 64, 113 N.E. 2d 85 (1953).
The basic principle that a state may tax only property within
its jurisdiction, Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199
U. S. 194 (1905); Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U. S. 473 (1925), has
led to this general rule in determining the tax situs of intangible
personal property: Intangible personal property has a tax situs
at the owner's domicile. Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Ken-
tucky, supra; Blodgett v. Silberman, 277 U. S. 1 (1928); Wheeling
Steel Corporation v. Fox, 298 U. S. 193 (1936). This general rule
has been stated in the maxim "mobilia. sequuntur personam."
'Blodgett v. Silberman ,supra. Also this rule has been well reasoned
on the ground that a citizen has a duty at the place of his domicile
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to contribute to the support of the state government in return
for the benefits of property protection and enjoyment. Curry v.
McCanless, 307 U. S. 357 (1939). With the growth of business
activities, the "business" or "'commercial situs" rule emerged so
that intangible personal property may acquire a business situs
at a place other than at the owner's domicile when such intangibles
becomes integral parts of some local business. Wheeling Steel
Corporation v. Fox, supra; Kelly Springfield Co. v. Tax Commis-
sion, 38 Ohio App. 109, 175 N.E. 700 (1931); Newark Fire Insur-
ance Co. v. State Board of Tax Appeals, 307 U. S. 313 (1939);
Note, 143 A.L.R. 361 (1943).
Since the domiciliary state, Curry v. McCanless, supra, and the
state in which the accounts receivable have acquired a business
situs, Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Fox, supra, may have concurring
jurisdiction to tax the same accounts receivable, double taxation
is quite possible. See Am. Jur., Taxation § 467; 104 A.L.R. 806
(1936); 79 A.L.R. 344 (1932); 76 A.L.R. 806 (1932). Although
several United States Supreme Court decisions have held that there
is no constitutional provision prohibiting double taxation, Curry v.
McCanless, supra; First Bank Stock Corp. v. Minnesota, 301 U. S.
234 (1937); Tax Commission v. Aldrich, 316 U. S. 174 (1942),
Ohio has adopted statutory provisions [Omo REv. CODE §§ 5709.02
(5328-1), 5709.03 (5328-2), 5701.08 (5325-1) ] with the intention
of avoiding this double taxation. Glander and Dewey, Taxation
of Accounts Receivable in Ohio -The Impact of Constitutional
Limitations, 11 OHtO ST. L. J. 173 (1950).
The following are the Ohio statutes pertaining to the situs
of accounts receivable used in business:
"... Property of the kinds and classes mentioned in
Section 5709.03 (5328-2) of the Rev. Code, used in and
arising out of business transacted in this state, by, for or
on behalf of a non-resident... shall be subject to taxation;
and all such property of persons residing in this state
used in and arising out of business transacted outside of
this state by, for or on behalf of such persons ... shall not
be subject to taxation ...." OHto REV. CODE 5709.02 (5328-
1) (Italics added).
"Property of the kinds and classes herein mentioned,
when used in business, shall be considered to arise out of
business transacted in a state other than that in which the
owner thereof resides in the cases and under the circum-
stances following:
"In the case of accounts receivable, when result-
ing from the sale of property sold by an agent hav-
ing an office in such other state or from services
performed by an officer, agent or employee con-
nected with, sent from or reporting to any officer
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or at any office located in such other state ....
"The provisions of this section shall be recip-
rocally applied, to the end that all property of the
kinds and classes mentioned in this section having
a business situs in this state shall be taxed herein
and no property of such kinds and classes belong-
ing to a person residing in this state and having a
business situs outside of this state shall be taxed
.... Omo REV. CODE 5709.03 (5328-2) (Italics
added).
"... Money, deposits, investments, accounts receivable
and prepaid debts, and other taxable intangibles shall be
considered to be "Used" when they... are applied... in
the conduct of the business, whether in this state or else-
where..." Orno REV. CODE 5701.08 (5325-1) (Italics add-
ed).
These statutes were initially interpreted in the case of Ransom
and Randolph v. Evatt, 142 Ohio St. 398, 52 N.E. 2d 738 (1944)
in which the Supreme Court of Ohio decided that accounts re-
ceivable of an Ohio corporation, to be exempt from the Ohio in-
tangible personal property tax, should arise from business trans-
acted outside of Ohio [as described in Orio REv. CODE § 5709.03
(5328-2) ] and should be used in the general business of the corpor-
ation, whether in Ohio or elsewhere [within the purview of OHio
REV. CODE § 5701.08 (5325-1)]. The effect of this Ransom and
Randolph decision was that, for domestic corporations, the sole
test for determining the tax situs of accounts receivable used
in business was whether the accounts receivable arose out of busi-
ness transacted in the non-resident state.
Because of the reciprocal situs provision of Orno REV. CODE
§5709.02 (5328-2), the Tax Commissioner applied the ruling of the
Ransom and Randolph case to foreign, nonresident businesses as
well as to domestic, resident businesses. However, the United States
Supreme Court, in Wheeling Steel Corporation and National Dis-
tillers Products v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562 (1948) reversing 150 Ohio
St. 229, 80 N.E 2d 863 (1948), held that the application of the single
test rule of the Ransom and Randolph case to the receivables of
foreign corporations denied equal protection of the law to the for-
eign corporations, since circumstances could be presented where
the accounts receivable of a domestic corporation would be exempt
from Ohio taxation while the accounts receivable of the foreign
corporation would be taxed. See Comment, 18 U. or Cin. L. REV.
496 (1949).
In June, 1950, the Tax Commissioner promulgated Rule 224
to obviate the constitutional defect which the United States Su-
preme Court found in the situs statute as interpreted in the Ran-
som and Randolph case. The rule required that for accounts re-
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ceivable to have a business situs in a non-resident state, they must
arise out of business transacted in the non-resident state and also
must be used in business outside of the non-resident state, "used
in business" meaning "subject to the control and management of
an agent or officer of the owner at an office in a state other than
that in which the owner thereof resides." The effect of this rule
was to require a dual business situs test for both domestic corpora-
tions (to decide if they were exempt from Ohio tax) and foreign
corporations (to decide if they were subject to Ohio tax).
Thus, the stage was set for the instant case of The Hoover Co.
v. Peck, supra, involving a domestic corporation whose accounts
receivable arose from business transacted outside of Ohio but which
were not used in business outside of Ohio. As we saw previously,
the Supreme Court of Ohio followed the single test of the Ransom
and Randolph case, reasoning that the Wheeling Steel Corporation
case applied only to foreign corporations as distinguished from do-
mestic corporations and that the legislature must have acquiesced
in the Ransom and Randolph decision since the statutes were not
subsequently amended. The effect of the instant case was to dis-
regard the reciprocity provision of OHto REv. CODE §5709.03
(5328-2).
After the instant case, Rule 224 was amended so that today the
Ohio rule for determining the tax situs of accounts receivable used
in business is as follows: (1) For resident businesses - From where
do the accounts receivable arise, as determined by the three tests
of Oino REV. CODE §5709.03 (5328-2)? If they arise from business
transacted outside of Ohio, they are exempt from Ohio tax even
though they are controlled and managed in Ohio. (2) For non-
resident businesses - From where do the accounts receivable arise,
as determined by the three tests of Onto REv. CODE § 5709.03
(5428-2) and at what office are the accounts receivable controlled
and managed?- If they arise from business transacted in Ohio, they
are still exempt unless they are also managed and controlled in
Ohio.
As a result of the present situation, Ohio is not receiving all
the taxes from intangible personal property to which it is consti-
tutionally entitled, since resident businesses escape the Ohio tax
by merely having their accounts receivable arise in another state.
It is submitted that the only way to correct this defect is to amend
Ono REv. CODE §5709.03 (5328-2) so that it is unequivocally indi-
cated that the legislature intends to apply a dual test for both resi-
dent and non-resident businesses. In this manner, the original in-
tention of preventing double taxation within Ohio will be carried
out concomitant with Ohio's receiving its fair share of revenue from
the tax on accounts receivable.
Thor G. Ronemus
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STATE TAxATIoN - REAL PRoPERTY
PARTAL ExwT PIo
Oino REv. CODE §5709.07 (5349) provides that "houses exclus-
ively used for public worship shall be exempt from taxation." The
board of tax appeals denied the application of the taxpayer church
for exemption from ad valorem taxation of a two story building,
the first floor of which contained the church auditorium and the
second floor of which had two suites of rooms, one of which is oc-
cupied by the janitor and his family, and the other by the church
minister and his family. The Board's opinion was predicated upon
its finding that there was no evidence that it was necessary for the
pastor and his family to reside in the said building. Split listing was
denied under Omro REv. CODE §5713.04 (5560) because more than
fifty percent of the building was used for private residential pur-
poses. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Ohio, held, reversed,
(4-3), the first floor being used exclusively for tax exempt pur-
poses could be set off, not on a percentage basis, but by a split
valuation of the separate entities of the building for tax purposes.
Church of God of Cleveland v. Board of Tax Appeals, 159 Ohio St.
517, 112 N.E. 2d 633 (1953). The dissent maintained that the plain
meaning of the statutory language "dxclusively" must be strictly
construed.
The Supreme Court of Ohio in its first interpretation of Article
XII, Section 2 of the Ohio Constitution and Onio REV. CODE §5709.07
(5349) held that to be exempt the building must be used exclusively
for public worship. Gerke v. Purcell, 25 Ohio St. 229 (1874). The
residence of the pastor was attached to the church. Then, in 1945
the problem of partial exemption was squarely presented to the
Supreme Court of Ohio with the argument that a building should
be physically split for tax purposes. Welfare Federation v. Glander,
146 Ohio St. 146, 64 N.E. 2d 813 (1945). Though the taxpayer in-
volved was a charitable institution the court rejected "partial ex-
emption" and interpreted the words "used exclusively" as contained
in the constitution and statute to mean the whole property must
be used for tax exempt purposes. This decision affirmed a former
strict construction that the use "exclusively" does not mean "in
part." Pfeiffer v. Jenkins, 141 Ohio St. 66, 46 N.E. 2d 767 (1943).
Therefore, the strict view toward partial exemption by split list-
ing, applied whether the housing of the personnel is physically at-
tached to the church (vertical split) or is located on a floor above
the church (horizontal split). Watterson v. Holiday, 77 Ohio St. 150,
82 N.E. 962 (1907); Massio v. Glander, 149 Ohio St. 433, 79 N.E. 2d
233, 15 A.L.R. 2d 1064 (1948). In Massio v. Glander, supra, there
was! involved a three story building, the first floor being occupied
as a chapel and the upper tvo floors were used for non-exempt
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purposes. Later, the court relented from the very narrow construc-
tion it had placed upon the words "used exclusively" and held, that
if the non-exempt use was incidental and necessary to the main
purpose the whole building would be exempt. In Re Bond Hill
Roselaw Hebrew School, 151 Ohio St. 70, 84 N.E. 2d 270 (1949).
The exemption involving a one-and-one half story building was
allowed though the caretaker was permitted to live rent free with
his family in rooms above the church. Though there seems to be no
factual distinction between the In re Bond Hill Roselaw Hebrew
School, supra, and the previous Gerke, Watterson, and Massio
cases, supra, the court attempted to distinguish these prior cases
on the basis that parsonages and parish houses are used primarily
as places of residence while the building in the instant case was
devoted primarily to public worship. But the court expressly de-
nied percentage splitting which was the theory upon which the tax
board in the instant case had based its decision. In October of 1949,
OHIo REV. CODE §5713.04 (5560) was amended to authorize the split
listing of a single parcel of real estate having single ownership if
it contained a "separate entity" used exclusively for tax exempt
purposes. A short time later this statute was construed and it was
held that one floor of a building is not a separate entity. Goldman
v. L. B. Harrison, 158 Ohio St. 181, 107 N.E. 2d 530 (1952). The
Goldman Case, supra, merely stated that Ouio REv. CODE §5713.04
(5560) was not applicable and decided the case on the basis that
the one exempt use was not incidental to the exempt purpose. The
dissent in the principal case thought the Harrison view should be
controlling, and that a single building used for both religious and
non-religious purposes does not answer the description of Orno
RElv. CODE §5713.04 (5560). The recent case of Welfare Federation
v. Peck, 160 Ohio St. 509, 117 N.E. 2d 1 (1954) approved split list-
ing and further affirmed the principal case, though the dissent re-
tained their position that a strict construction of the Ohio Consti-
tution would not permit split listing of a building having a single
ownership.
The principal case allows an exemption to the first floor
even though the second floor is used for non-exempt purposes.
(horizontal splitting). This construction would impliedly include
vertical splitting since it is more easily adopted to precise quanta-
tive separation. The principal case also squarely presents the prob-
lem: What is a separate entity? A separate entity has been defined
as composed of two elements, namely, independent use and ca-
pable of separate ownership. Cincinnati College v. Yeatman, 30
Ohio St. 276 (1876). Logically, it should make no difference, there-
fore, whether the split is horizontal or vertical since they are both
capable of independent use and separate ownership. This would
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theoretically extend-to one room in the Empire State Building.
The majority view in the principal case allows the church ex-
emption of the area used for worship and yet it does not place the
taxpayer at an undue disadvantage since the church pays taxes
on the remainder of its property. The court adopted a liberal view
which eliminates the problems and injustices of the "incidental ap-
proach." The decision indicates an extension of the power of the
legislature to exempt property, which in the interest of sound tax
administration this extension should be expressly stated in the con-
stitution.
William F. Newman
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATIoN -THE NEcEssARY ELEMENT FOR
EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP
Petitioner, a farmer, was injured while operating his own corn
picker on the farm of a neighbor. No compensation was to be re-
ceived for the work as the petitioner was returning work volun-
tarily done for him by the neighbor. The only communication be-
tween the farmers occurred when the owner of the farm gave the
petitioner instructions as to the cutting. The Industrial Commis-
sion of Wisconsin ruled that the petitioner was an employee of the
farm owner and awarded compensation for the injury. In affirm-
ing on appeal, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that an im-
plied contract of hire arose through the custom of the community
to repay one for labor performed and that the right to control was
manifested when the farm owner told the petitioner how to do the
cutting. This was sufficient under the Workmen's Compensation
Act to warrant the finding of an employer-employee relationship.
Gant v. Industrial Commission, 263 Wis. 64, 56 N.W. 2d 525 (1953).
The common law required four elements to sustain a finding
of a master-servant relationship. These were:
1) selection and engagement of the servant;
2) payment of wages;
3) power of dismissal;
4) power of the control of the servant's conduct.
Carman v. The Steubenville and Indiana Railroad Co., 4 Ohio St.
399 (1854); 35 Ai. JuR., Master and Servant, § 2; Atlantic Coast
Line R. Co. v. Tredway, 120 Va. 735, 93 S. E. 560 (1917). State
legislatures, in providing for Workmen's Compensation benefits,
created a system to charge personal injuries to business costs and
eliminate the waste, inequities and the harassment of both em-
ployers and employees involved in the common law method of com-
pensation. 42 0. Jur., Workmen's Compensation §1. The acts now
require only a showing of a contract of hire, express or implied, in
[Vol. 15
RECENT DECISIONS
place of all four common law elements to constitute an employer-
employee relationship. Oio REv. CODE §4123.01 (1953); Wis. STAT.;
102.07-4; Drexler v. Labay, 155 Ohio St. 244, 98 N.E. 2d 410 (1951);
Case v. Industrial Commission, 231 Wis. 133, 285 N.W. 539 (1939).
Therefore, the major test today is the right to control the details
of the work performed, whether such right is exercised or not.
Firestone v. Industrial Commission, 144 Ohio St. 398, 59 N.E. 2d
147 (1945); Gillum v. Industrial Commission, 141 Ohio St. 373, 48
N.E. 2d 234 (1943); State v., Whims, 68 Ohio App. 39, 39 N.E. 2d
596 (1941); Home v. Industrial Commission, 248 Wis. 5, 20 N.W.
2d 573 (1945); Ebner v. Industrial Commission, 252 Wis. 199, 31
N.W. 2d 172 (1948). The retention of the "right to control" test
allows an employer to prescribe the manner of doing the work and
to be responsible for the methods used by the employee.
It is possible to refute the alleged existence of an employer-
employee relationship by a showing that such service performed
was either (1) that of an independent contractor, or (2) casual.
Workmen's Compensation benefits have not been extended to this
area in which an employer's responsibility would be greater than
his power to control the employee and protect himself.
The existence of an independent contractor relationship is test-
ed by determining if a person has the right to control the work of
another. If the control is delegated or left to the person doing the
work and he. is responsible to the employer only for the result,
then the relationship is that of an independent contractor. Phaneof
v. Industrial Commission, 263 Wis. 376, 57 N.W. 2d 408 (1953);
Behner v. Industrial Commission, 154 Ohio St. 433, 96 N.E. 2d 403
(1951); Bobik v. Industrial Commission, 146 Ohio St 187, 64 N.E.
2d 829 (1946); Industrial Commission v. Laird, 126 Ohio St. 617,
186 N.E. 718 (1933); Clifton v. Industrial Commission, 52 Ohio L.
Abs. 144, 82 N.E. 2d 754 (1945); Marrie v. Industrial Commission,
37 Ohio Op. 384, 81 N.E. 2d 300 (1947). The absence of the right to
control the worker is imperative for an independent contractor re-
lationship. Bobik v. Industrial Commission, supra.
The test for casual employment is not the duration of services,
but whether or not the services were performed in a connection
other than the trade or business of the employer. Schneeberg v.
Industrial Commission, 67 Ohio App. 499, 37 N.E. 2d 427 (1941).
As long as a person works in the "usual course of the trade, busi-
ness, profession, or occupation of the employer" regular employ-
ment exists. Bettman v. Christen, 128 Ohio St. 56, 190 N.E. 233
(1934); State v. Sword, 43 Ohio L. Abs. 345, 62 N.E. 2d 506 (1945);
Smith v. Brockamp, 81 Ohio App. 381, 77 N.E. 2d 727 (1947). But
the majority of cases hold that employment which is for a limited
or temporary purpose lasting but a few days or weeks is casual.
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For a collection of cases see 58 Am. JuR., Workmen's Compensa-
tion, §94; Re Cagnor, 217 Mass. 86, 104 N.E. 339 (1914); 107 A.L.R.
941 (1937); Van Nuyes v. Levine, 11 N.J. Misc. 309, 165 Ati. 885,
33 A.L.R. 1464, 1465 (1932); Chicago G.W., R.R. v. Industrial Com-
mission, 284 Ill. 573, 120 N.W. 508 (1913).
The court in the principal case relied upon Northern Trust Co.
v. Industrial Commission, supra, to establish the implied contract.
In that case, two farmer employers had often exchanged labor with-
out any money payments, except for machinery loaned. The bor-
rowing farmer was held to be the employer of the workers loaned
from the other farmer-employee. But a more recent case has re-
quired that a consensual relationship exist between the employee
and the borrower in order to create a new employer-employee re-
lationship, and that such a relationship cannot be created by the
command of the original employer. Boehck Equipment Co. v. In-
dustrial Commission, 246 Wis. 178, 16 N.W. 2d 298 (1944); Com-
bustion Engineering Co., Raymond Pulverizer Division v. Industri-
al Commission, 254 Wis. 167, 35 N.W. 2d 317 (1948). It appears
that such "consensual relationship" is lacking in the principal case,
since the exchange of work occurred but once under no legal ob-
ligation, and no agreement to exchange work on such a basis was
evident. Bituminous Casualty Co. v. Industrial Commission, 245
Wis. 337, 13 N.W. 2d 923 (1944).
To imply a contract relationship, Wisconsin requires that a
person accept services from another which are valuable to him.
In re St. Germain's Estate, 246 Wis. 409, 17 N.W. 2d 582 (1945).
But Ohio appears to be more strict, and has held that an implied
contract was not created where a person merely performed serv-
ices with the expectation of receiving compensation. Tanski V.
White, 92 Ohio App. 411, 109 N.E. 2d 319 (1952). Thus, Ohio courts
may well follow Wisconsin in recognizing an employer-employee
relationship where employers exchange workers quite often or
where services are rendered under a legal obligation in which
some form of compensation must be returned. But is is doubtful
if Ohio courts will go the step further to create an implied contract
and such a relationship where labor is exchanged under a com-
munity custom, not subject to legal enforcement. While such an
act may not be classified as that of an independent contractor, the
belief is expressed that work on an exchange for one time only as
in the principal case could be termed a "casual" relationship.
Theron C. Mock
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